**Background Paper for
The Shared Homeland Paradigm Project:**

Urban Political Institutions in Contested Territories:

A Comparative View across Post-Conflict, Mixed, and Trans-Boundary Cities

Nathan Marom
February 2026

1. Introduction: Urban Political Institutions in Contested Urban Territories

In the last few decades, post-conflict cities have become focal points for political reconstruction, social reconciliation, and institutional innovation. These cities, often divided along ethnic, religious, or national lines, are where the legacies of violent conflict and exclusion visibly intersect with everyday governance. Post-conflict urban governance thus refers to the set of formal and informal institutions developed to administer cities recovering from ethnonational, sectarian, or territorial conflicts. This takes place through a wide range of **urban political institutions** (UPIs) designed to manage diversity, share power, and rebuild shared urban spaces. UPIs serve multiple purposes: stabilizing fragile political orders, rebuilding service delivery, and fostering inclusion across divided communities. They are both products of conflict legacies and laboratories for new governance forms that merge local needs and norms, international peacebuilding mechanisms, and urban administrative frameworks. UPIs often blend formal legal structures with informal practices of negotiation and compromise. They are rarely about returning to a pre-war status quo (Beall et al., 2013).

This Background Paper explores the main institutional types developed in post-conflict cities and illustrates their operation through global examples. It focuses on two distinct urban contexts (although overlaps exist):

- **"Mixed" cities** where diverse communities live side by side within the same jurisdiction but remain divided by identity markers and unequal access to governance.

- **Transboundary urban regions** that straddle contested borders, requiring coordination across political, national, or de facto state boundaries.

UPIs vary in their goals and functions depending on the context and scale in which they operate, especially between these two types of mixed cities and transboundary urban regions. However, they often serve several critical functions:

- **Stabilization** – preventing renewed violence through shared mechanisms on the ground.

- **Reconstruction** – coordinating recovery or renovation of infrastructure, housing, and public space.

- **Representation** – ensuring that historically excluded or rival groups have access to power and services, embedding former adversaries in shared decision-making structures.

- **Integration** – encouraging contact and cooperation across communities through shared planning and management of resources.

- **Reconciliation** – could be considered as the cumulation of the abovementioned functions, manifested in a wide political and social acceptance of peaceful relations.

At the outset of this paper, it is important to emphasize that cities are not simply "victims" of conflict that is imposed on them "from above", whether broader (and sometimes cross-border) national-ethnic or religious divisions, warring states, or international geopolitics. Neither are cities neutral backgrounds or local "containers" of conflict and violence that is played out on their stage without their "consent" or contribution . Rather, cities, urban spaces, and local institutions are often important (if rarely exclusive) sources of conflict, as well as social and material environments that shape its dynamics and affect its outcomes. This could take place through intense competition over urban space, economic opportunities, social norms and behaviors, cultural meanings, local histories and myths – such as in the conflict over communal "territories" or over religious and symbolic sites (that tie together many of these dimensions). Hence, in many cases, urban conflicts both feed on and feed into other scales of conflict, creating multidirectional feedbacks between local, citywide, national, regional, and even international discords. At the same time, because of their active and very concrete role in shaping wider conflicts, cities can also be uniquely placed to support processes of reconciliation through their unique combination of resources and institutions that impact everyday life and perceptions. Well-known cases such as Belfast and Sarajevo are good (if always uneasy) examples of this potential.

That is why urban political institutions are critical to conflict resolution and post-conflict governance. This includes high-level political institutions such as municipal and metropolitan governments, city councils, and economic development funds. It also includes both formal and informal institutions that manage land, housing, urban planning and development, both at a strategic metro/citywide level and at very local scale through their "mundane" impacts on local communities and everyday life. These are paradigmatic urban institutions that might not always seem political and therefore must be given careful consideration and even be prioritized in addressing the transition to post-conflict cities. In some of the case studies described below, this has clearly been the case, such as different planning, housing, and transport policies to address the spatial legacies of apartheid in Johannesburg (and other South African cities) or in the slum rehabilitation policies in Mumbai (and many other Indian and Global South metropolises) that also seek to address communal tensions and urban marginalization.

1.1. Institutional Formations in Mixed Cities

Mixed cities are urban environments where multiple ethnic, religious, or national communities live within one jurisdiction but maintain distinct identities and often compete over land, resources, or political control. Institutional innovations in such cities aim to manage coexistence and prevent dominance by any single group.

Consociational and power-sharing models

One of the most influential institutional responses in mixed cities is consociationalism, adapted from national-level peace frameworks to the urban scale (Lijphart, 1977). The consociational model advocates formal power-sharing among identity-based (or other) groups to ensure proportional representation and mutual veto rights, as well as some degree of autonomy and proportionality in resource allocations and other public sphere appointments. At the city level, this may include ethnically balanced councils, rotating mayoralties, and joint decision-making committees. Consociational institutions are designed to stabilize divided societies by guaranteeing representation for all key communities, reducing zero-sum politics, and embedding cooperation into local governance. The principle of non-domination has since grown to be one of the key objectives in power-sharing theory. While these arrangements prevent dominance of particular groups, they can also ossify divisions and reinforce identity-based politics, making it difficult to transition toward civic-based representation.

Examples:

In Belfast, Northern Ireland, the post-1998 Good Friday Agreement inspired a new urban governance model emphasizing inclusion and balanced representation in local government of the rival Protestant and Catholic communities. The Belfast City Council adopted mechanisms ensuring proportional representation of unionist and nationalist parties. This was complemented by initiatives like the Shared City Partnership, designed to foster cross-community engagement in local decision-making (Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006).

Similarly, in Mostar, in post-civil-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative imposed in 2004 a unified municipal administration to bridge divisions between Croats and Bosniaks. However, the system, featuring equal power-sharing and rotating mayoral positions, has faced criticism for reinforcing ethnic identities rather than seeking to transcend them (Gusic, 2019).

In Beirut, post-civil war governance was rooted in the 1989 Taif Agreement, which mandated sectarian proportionality at the national level as well as decentralization (which has yet to be applied). Municipal candidates are elected according to plurality at-large voting, which incentivizes cross-sectarian cooperation in joint lists to secure votes and establish parity[1]. While this institutional framework

---

[1] In the May 2025 municipal elections, the "Beirut Unites Us" list ran as a big tent alliance between most of the political parties, including those with significant animosity such as the Lebanese Forces (Christian) and Hezbollah (Shiite), to ensure sectarian parity on the Beirut city council. It secured 23 out of 24 seats.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Lebanese_municipal_elections#Beirut

created stability, it entrenched sectarian clientelism in urban planning and service delivery (Fawaz, 2009).

<u>Decentralized and autonomist institutions</u>

Decentralization involves devolving decision-making power to local or sub-municipal units, often to ensure minority communities can manage their own affairs. In some cases, this takes the form of local territorial autonomy within a broader municipal framework. This institutional type seeks to defuse tensions by granting groups a sense of control over local issues, such as education, planning, or policing, while maintaining an overarching shared city administration. It embodies the principle of subsidiarity, ensuring governance occurs at the most local feasible level. However, decentralization can inadvertently entrench segregation, particularly if resource distribution remains unequal or if communities use local autonomy to exclude others. Coordination across jurisdictions also becomes more complex.

<u>Examples:</u>
In both Baghdad and Kirkuk in Iraq, post-2003 governance reforms promoted decentralization to accommodate ethnic and sectarian diversity. Local councils were created under the 2005 Iraqi Constitution to provide representation for Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen populations. Yet decentralization in these ethnically mixed cities has often reproduced contestation when resource control and territorial claims remain unresolved (Isakhan, 2015).

In Sarajevo, district-level administrations were maintained after the war to reflect the city's ethnic composition (see separate section below).

<u>Participatory and hybrid governance models</u>

Participatory institutions emerged as part of a global turn toward inclusive governance, emphasizing citizen engagement beyond elite power-sharing. Hybrid governance blends formal state institutions with civil society participation, traditional authorities, or donor-led structures.

These mechanisms aim to rebuild trust and social cohesion through joint urban projects such as neighborhood councils, participatory budgeting, or collaborative planning. They seek to move beyond ethnic representation toward functional cooperation around shared problems (e.g., infrastructure, sanitation, or housing). But participatory processes can also be co-opted by dominant groups, and hybrid arrangements often lack legal clarity or sustainability once donor support ends.

<u>Examples:</u>

In many mixed cities, particularly in the Global South, hybrid and participatory governance mechanisms have complemented formal power-sharing. In post-apartheid

South Africa, Johannesburg and other cities transitioned toward inclusive urban governance through the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process, designed to integrate historically segregated communities into planning frameworks (Parnell & Robinson, 2006. See detailed section below). Elsewhere, Mostar's community fora and Belfast's neighborhood partnerships are examples of efforts to localize reconciliation through "shared space" partnerships that bring residents together on practical issues like public space management.

1.2. Institutional Formations in Transboundary Urban Regions

Transboundary urban regions straddle recognized national borders, or de facto borders where sovereignty is contested or fragmented. Here, institutional innovations to address post-conflict (or enduring low-conflict) situations focus on coordination across political boundaries rather than within a single (but internally divided) polity. Transboundary formations also often extend in scale beyond city limits to the metropolitan and wider regional scale.

<u>Cross-border metropolitan cooperation bodies and joint planning authorities</u>

These institutions facilitate joint management of shared metropolitan functions – transport, environment, water, health – across borders. They often take the form of joint planning committees, bi-national development agencies, or informal coordination councils. They are designed to maintain the functional integration of urban regions divided by borders, enabling pragmatic cooperation even when political disputes persist. However, their authority is usually limited, dependent on the goodwill of higher-level governments or international mediators. Moreover, continued political asymmetry between sides can undermine equality of participation.

<u>Special legal or administrative regimes</u>

Some divided or contested cities are governed through **special legal or administrative regimes**, often created under international auspices. These include international protectorates or special metropolitan authorities that oversee security, reconstruction, and public works. Such institutions attempt to depoliticize everyday governance by embedding it in technocratic or internationalized structures. They act as neutral platforms for dialogue and confidence-building while ensuring service continuity. While stabilizing, these arrangements may lack legitimacy if perceived as externally imposed, and they often fail to evolve into locally owned governance.

<u>Examples:</u>

The Nicosia Master Plan in Cyprus is considered a successful transboundary urban project.

Initiated in 1979 under UN auspices, it established a bi-communal planning committee of Greek and Turkish Cypriot professionals to coordinate urban rehabilitation across the Green Line. The Plan's joint technical committees institutionalized cross-border dialogue even amid political stalemate (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009).

In Mitrovica, Kosovo, the city's division along the Ibar River has produced a dual-municipality structure: North Mitrovica (Serb-majority) and South Mitrovica (Albanian-majority). International missions, first under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and later under the EU, introduced Joint Interim Administrative Structures to manage shared infrastructure, as well as a Mitrovica Bridge Peace Park (Visoka, 2017).

El Paso–Ciudad Juárez on the U.S.–Mexico border is a transboundary metropolis that has developed institutions like the Borderplex Alliance and Paso del Norte Health Foundation to address shared urban challenges across national jurisdictions. Although not a post-war context, it exemplifies how cross-border governance can sustain interaction amid political and economic asymmetry (See detailed section below).

*

UPIs in post-conflict and contested territories represent adaptations of broader peacebuilding logics to the urban scale. Whether through power-sharing, decentralization, participation, or cross-border collaboration, they embody efforts to transform divided urban environments into shared spaces of coexistence. Despite differences in context (mixed or transboundary cities) and governance logics, these institutions aim to create "shared urban spaces" – both for physical cohabitation and institutionalized cooperation. However, these institutions remain fragile and must be backed by trust-building processes, equitable resource distribution, equal rights, and inclusive citizenship (Calame and Charlesworth, 2009). Their long-term success depends therefore not only on institutional design but also on a political culture of inclusion and the capacity of local actors to transcend identity politics.

The next sections present four detailed case studies of UPIs in post-conflict cities, beginning with the paradigmatic case of Sarajevo, a post-war city with elements of both mixed and transboundary urban territories. The overview continues with two Global South "mixed cities", Johannesburg and Mumbai, followed by the transboundary urban region of San Diego-Tijuana. The background paper concludes with some comparative reflections drawn from these four cases on the role of UPIs in peacebuilding.

2. Urban Political Institutions in Post-War Sarajevo

Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH), presents a cross-over case of a mixed city in a transboundary urban context. Sarajevo endured one of the longest sieges in modern history (1992–1995). The **Dayton Peace Accords (1995)** ended the Bosnian war but institutionalized a complex, ethnically segmented governance structure across the country. Sarajevo became both the administrative capital of the **Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)** and a divided urban region split between the **Sarajevo Canton** (Bosniak-majority) and **East Sarajevo** (Serb-majority), which is part of the **Republika Srpska (RS)** (Bose, 2002; Donais, 2013). An inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) separates the two "entities" (FBiH and RS), as well as the two sectors of Sarajevo. This political geography produced a fragmented urban space, where post-war UPIs were tasked not only with physical reconstruction but also with managing inter-entity coordination, ethnic representation, and peacebuilding at the everyday level.

Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo Canton with the districts of Sarajevo (Source: Gül and Dee, 2015; in Zivali & Ayataç, 2020).[2]

---

[2] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342927358_A_Characterization_of_Public_Space_The_Conceptual_Transformation_in_Sarajevo

Map of Sarajevo according to the Dayton Peace Agreement's political boundary line (Source: Zivali, 2023)[3]

<u>Stabilization: Securing Governance and Basic Urban Functionality</u>

Immediately after Dayton, stabilization efforts were led by internationally supervised administrative bodies under the Office of the High Representative (OHR), supported by the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the World Bank's Emergency Reconstruction Program. Urban stabilization included two intertwined objectives: restoring municipal governance in the Federation and RS-controlled areas and ensuring service continuity (water, electricity, transport) across the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL) dividing Sarajevo and East Sarajevo. To this end, the Sarajevo Canton Government was established in 1996 as a semi-autonomous unit with responsibility for police, education, and utilities, acting as an intermediary between the FBiH government and local municipalities. On the RS side, East Sarajevo City Administration emerged as a counterpart institution. Stabilization relied heavily on joint service agreements negotiated under OHR supervision, such as the Sarajevo Regional Water Supply System and inter-entity waste management coordination (World Bank, 1999, 2000). These arrangements were technocratic but crucial in preventing the total institutional separation of the city's two halves.

---

[3] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372090843_A_Battle_of_Memory_and_Image_War_Tourism_as_Reconstruction_Strategy_in_Sarajevo

Representation: Power-Sharing and Multi-Ethnic Governance

Representation mechanisms in Sarajevo were modeled on the Dayton Constitution's consociational framework (Bose, 2002). The urban political system included ethnically balanced municipal councils and rotational leadership positions, designed to guarantee participation of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in decision-making. The **City of Sarajevo Statute** (1997)[4] established a four-municipality structure – Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, and Stari Grad – with proportional representation of the three constituent peoples. However, the replication of ethnic quotas at multiple administrative levels (city, canton, entity) created institutional overlap and bureaucratic inertia (Bieber, 2006). Nevertheless, these institutions served the peacebuilding function of political stabilization through representation, helping to legitimize governance structures in a deeply divided context. The **Sarajevo Canton Assembly** became a forum for post-war dialogue among party elites, a space where negotiated compromises over urban management, education, and planning could take shape.

Integration: Joint Spatial Governance and Everyday Peacebuilding

From the early 2000s, attention shifted from stabilization to integration by rebuilding the functional and symbolic unity of Sarajevo. The **Sarajevo Economic Region Development Agency (SERDA)**, established in 2003 with EU and UNDP backing, became a key institutional actor promoting metropolitan integration.[5] SERDA coordinated projects across both entities, including joint transport corridors, employment programs, and tourism development as part of a wider effort of economic reconstruction of BH (Tzifakis & Tsardanidis, 2013).

At the local scale, "local communities" **(mjesne zajednice)** played important integrative roles in mixed or transitional areas, particularly through participatory planning processes facilitated by UNDP's local governance projects, MZ project, and MEG (Municipal Environmental Governance) project.[6] These initiatives enabled citizens from different ethnic backgrounds to engage in joint decision-making on infrastructure and public space improvements, reinforcing everyday coexistence.

Reconstruction: From Physical Rebuilding to Symbolic Reunification

Physical reconstruction in Sarajevo was driven by a mix of international aid, local government initiatives, and donor-led urban projects. Between 1996 and 1999, the donor community endorsed a US$5.1 billion reconstruction target, and over US$1.2 billion was invested in projects for housing, roads, and public buildings (World Bank, 2000). Over time, international institutions such as the European Commission and UN-

---

[4] https://www.ohr.int/ohr_archive/statute-of-the-city-of-sarajevo-27-march-1997/
[5] https://serda.ba/en/about-us/history/1
[6] https://www.undp.org/bosnia-herzegovina/projects/mz-project
 https://www.undp.org/bosnia-herzegovina/projects/meg-ii-project

Habitat shifted the approach towards a coordinated reconstruction programme that emphasized city-wide recovery. Key projects included the rehabilitation of the Bascarsija historic center, symbolizing the multicultural heritage of pre-war Sarajevo, reconstruction of the Vijećnica (Sarajevo City Hall) as a symbol of unity and cultural resilience, and housing reconstruction in Grbavica and Dobrinja, areas directly affected by frontline fighting. These projects were politically significant, serving as acts of symbolic peacebuilding that reasserted Sarajevo's role as a shared urban space.[7]

Institutional Challenges: Fragmentation and the Limits of Power-Sharing

Despite progress, post-war Sarajevo remains institutionally fragmented. Scholars describe its governance as being simultaneously hyper-decentralized and ethnically compartmentalized (Bieber, 2006). Multiple tiers, including municipalities, the canton, the entities (FbiH, RS), and the state compete over planning, taxation, and development control. The dual-city structure (Sarajevo and East Sarajevo) hinders cohesive metropolitan governance and limits cross-boundary infrastructure integration. The absence of metropolitan-level institutions remains a key weakness in Sarajevo's long-term governance capacity. Moreover, the ethnic quota system, while stabilizing, has inhibited merit-based appointments and reduced incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. Power-sharing has thus produced a paradox of political stability without administrative efficiency (Donais, 2013).

Conclusion

Sarajevo underscores the importance of multi-level, power-sharing urban governance, combined with joint planning institutions and inclusive public spaces. Yet it also warns of the long-term costs of maintaining rigid ethnic administrative divisions, which limit functional integration. Post-war Sarajevo represents a case where urban governance institutions simultaneously embody power-sharing and fragmentation. The city's institutional landscape evolved from international stabilization missions to locally driven, yet ethnically segmented, governance systems. While reconstruction and integration initiatives have symbolically reunited the urban fabric, metropolitan fragmentation persists as a structural legacy of the Dayton Agreement. In sum, Sarajevo's UPIs reveal both the potential and the limitations of institutionalized inclusion: they succeed in preventing renewed conflict but struggle to foster a unified, efficient, and genuinely shared urban polity.

---

[7] More recent plans in that vein which also incorporate sustainability goals include the Urban Transformation Project Sarajevo (UTPS) led by ETH Zurich (2021-2025) and the Green Cantonal Action Plan for Sarajevo (2020) led by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). See: https://utps.ethz.ch/ and https://www.ebrdgreencities.com/assets/Uploads/PDF/EBRD-Sarajevo-GCAP-FINAL-EN-v5-2-For-ISSUE.pdf

3. Urban Political Institutions in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg

The end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 marked one of the most significant political transitions of the late twentieth century – from a situation of chronic conflict and violence on the verge of civil war to a peaceful and democratic resolution. Nowhere were the tensions and possibilities of this transition more visible than in Johannesburg, a city historically structured around racial segregation, spatial exclusion, and economic inequality. The creation and evolution of post-apartheid urban political institutions in Johannesburg were central to the broader national project of democratic reconstruction and inclusive development. This transformation unfolded through a reconfiguration of governance frameworks, new participatory mechanisms, and developmental planning instruments designed to reconcile competing imperatives of growth, redistribution, and inclusion.

In 1996, shortly after the end of apartheid, the enumerated population of Johannesburg was over 2.5 million (2,634,126). In the 15 years until 2011 it increased by 68.4 per cent to almost 4.5 million (4,434,828). During the same period, the national population grew by only 28 per cent (Harrison et al., 2014). According to the 2022 South African National Census, the population of Johannesburg is 4,803,262 people, making it the most populous city in South Africa.[8] In 2019, 80.2% of the population was Black, 9.8% White, 5.3% Coloured and 4.7% Indian.[9]

Race category	Population in 1996 (%)	Population in 2011 (%)	Percentage absolute change 1996–2011
African	70.2	76.6	83.6
Coloured	6.5	5.6	46.2
White	18.7	12.2	10.0
Indian/Asian	3.7	4.8	120.0
Other	0.9	0.8	49.0
Total	100.0	100.0	68.4

TABLE 1.4: Change in the race composition of Johannesburg's population, 1996–2011
Source: Stats SA (1998, 2012)

[8] https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=993&id=city-of-johannesburg-municipality
[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johannesburg#Demographics

Maps of City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CoJMM) with 11 regions (2000-6) later consolidated into 7 regions (Source: Wikipedia[10])

Institutional Reconfiguration and Metropolitan Governance

The immediate post-apartheid period witnessed the restructuring of Johannesburg's local governance from a fragmented system of racially defined municipalities into a unified metropolitan government. The **Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC)** was established in 1995, consolidating eleven local authorities into an overarching governance structure designed to promote equity and service delivery across previously divided spaces This institutional transformation sought to dismantle the apartheid-era "municipal enclaves" that had concentrated resources in white suburbs while underfunding black townships. In 2000, the GJTMC was replaced by the **City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (CoJMM)**, a "Unicity" model intended to enhance administrative coherence and developmental capacity. This restructuring reflected the national framework of "developmental local government" articulated in the White Paper on Local Government (1998), which emphasized municipalities as key actors in addressing poverty and inequality. CoJMM thus became a primary institutional site for realizing democratic decentralization, balancing participatory governance with managerial efficiency (Beall et al., 2002; Beauregard & Tomlinson, 2007; Harrison et al., 2007).

---

[10] See also cartography section in:
https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/29461/9781776142392_WEB.pdf?

COJMM is run by a Mayor–Council government. The Municipal Council consists (as of 2016) of 270 City councillors elected by mixed-member proportional representation. The councillors are divided into two kinds: (a) 135 Ward councillors who have been elected by first-past-the-post voting in 135 wards; and (b) 135 councillors elected from party lists. COJMM has no quotas reserved to representatives by race, ethnicity, religion, or other criteria.[11] Since its inception, it was mostly headed by the African National Congress (2000-2016, 2019-2021, 2024-present), with short period of rule by the main opposition party, Democratic Alliance (2016-2019, 2021-2022) and the minority party Al Jama-ah (2023-24).

Alongside COJMM, the **"iGoli 2002" program** was a major municipal reform initiative that sought to restore financial sustainability by corporatizing city services – a move that was criticized for introducing market logic into social delivery (Beauregard & Tomlinson, 2007). This tension between neoliberal urban management and developmental equity encapsulated the contradictions of post-apartheid institutional reform.

<u>The Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and Strategic Planning</u>

A cornerstone of post-apartheid urban governance was the introduction of **Integrated Development Planning (IDP)**, a statutory process required by the Municipal Systems Act (2000). The IDP institutionalized strategic, participatory planning that linked budgeting, service delivery, and spatial transformation (Tomlinson et al., 2003; Visser, 2001). Johannesburg's early IDPs (particularly the 2002–2007 and 2007–2011 plans) were framed around the city's early post-apartheid long-term vision document, **Joburg 2030** (2002) which sought to align economic competitiveness with social inclusion. The IDP process established forums for public participation through **ward committees** and the **Mayoral Lekgotla**. These structures aimed to democratize decision-making and institutionalize community input in urban development priorities. However, participation often remained constrained by technocratic practices and uneven capacities, limiting genuine co-production (Lipietz, 2008). Despite these limitations, the IDP institutional framework represented a critical innovation in post-conflict governance, embedding developmental mandates within municipal institutions. Similarly, the **Inner City Charter (2007)**, co-produced with civil society organizations, represented one of the most participatory urban governance initiatives, establishing institutional mechanisms for ongoing dialogue between municipal authorities, residents, and business actors (Lipietz, 2008).

Johannesburg's political institutions were shaped by broader discourses of social justice and urban citizenship. In 2006, the city's first **Growth and Development Strategy (GDS 2006)** explicitly linked growth strategies to social inclusion through

---

[11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_Johannesburg_Metropolitan_Municipality#City_council

programs targeting informal settlements, housing delivery, and service access. A notable feature of the GDS 2040 institutional framework is its emphasis on multi-level and participatory governance. The strategy explicitly incorporates the IDP and ward-based planning mechanisms, ensuring alignment between long-term visioning and annual budget cycles (Parnell & Robinson, 2006; Harrison, 2016). Importantly, GDS 2006 presented a long-term strategic plan for the city with a much stronger focus on equity and an emphasis on the 'proactive absorption of the poor', 'balanced and shared growth' and 'settlement restructuring' (CoJ 2006). Considerable resources were allocated into improving infrastructure and services in former township areas, particularly Soweto, with significant impact on access to services and infrastructural conditions in these areas (Todes, 2014). According to Pieterse (2019), "the GDS asked and answered questions about the overall approach to development in the metropolis, set out a vision, and elaborated a set of long-term goals and strategic interventions… [it] provided a platform for innovative new strategies that seek to address Johannesburg's distorted settlement patterns."

The GDS became the basis for a Growth Management Strategy (GMS), formulated in 2008, which "defined the desired spatial form of a future Johannesburg with a view to engaging with the stubborn drivers of uneven and unequal land use and property development. Most significant, the GMS compels the City of Joburg to confront its own complicity in this process as the regulatory authority that considers planning applications and grant approvals" (Pieterse, 2019).

The GMS made much stronger arguments on the need for urban restructuring to address spatial inequalities than had been present in previous plans. Incentives to encourage the development of affordable housing for the working poor in public transport management areas were proposed and processes to enable the identification of well-located land for low-cost and inclusive housing were put in place (CoJ 2011). (Todes 2014).

Chronology of various strategic plans in the City of Johannesburg (Source: Coovadia, 2023[12])

Development Agencies and Public–Private Partnerships

Parallel to these planning instruments, Johannesburg experimented with semi-autonomous development agencies to drive urban renewal. The **Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA)**, established in 2001, became a pivotal institution for implementing strategic projects, including the Newtown Cultural Precinct, Constitution Hill, and Corridors of Freedom initiatives. These projects exemplified attempts to spatially reintegrate the city, foster local economic development, and symbolize democratic renewal (Pieterse, 2019). The JDA's hybrid structure, combining municipal oversight with private-sector flexibility, reflected broader trends in urban governance toward networked and multi-actor institutions. Yet such models often risked privileging investment-led regeneration over grassroots inclusion, perpetuating uneven development (Nengomasha, 2021). Balancing efficiency with equity thus remained a central institutional challenge in Johannesburg's post-apartheid governance landscape.

Enhanced Initiatives for Sociospatial Integration (2010-20s)

In the second decade of the 2000s, Johannesburg's post-apartheid urban political institutions undertook a new phase of strategic planning centered on spatial integration and inclusive urbanism. The importance given to spatial restructuring increased with the installation of a new mayor, Parks Tau, in 2011. There was also growing pressure by local politicians to address socio-spatial divisions and the limited extent of economic development in former townships. While the ideas were not new, there was far greater political support for them than in the past (Todes, 2014). Two key initiatives represent this renewed institutional commitment to building a more cohesive and just city: the revised **Growth and Development Strategy 2040 (GDS 2040)** and the **Corridors of Freedom (CoF)**.

---

[12] Coovadia, Y. (2023) Review of Strategic Plans in the City of Johannesburg. South African Cities Network.

The GDS 2040, adopted by the CoJ in 2011, is a long-term policy framework that articulates the city's developmental vision through four interrelated outcomes: improved quality of life, a resilient and competitive economy, sustainable human settlements, and a responsive, accountable government (CoJ, 2011). It thus shifted the emphasis further from economic growth toward social transformation and spatial justice, while committing the city to an ambitious program aimed at urban resilience and environmental sustainability. It also used a far more extensive participatory process than before, the GDS Outreach Program, held across the city's regions to solicit public input. GDS 2040 thus institutionalized a shift from top-down urban management to a transformative governance model emphasizing inclusion and sustainability, reflecting the CoJ's evolving approach toward deliberative democracy.

Corridors of Freedom: Spatial Integration and Public Space Creation

Launched in 2013 under Mayor Tau, the Corridors of Freedom (CoF) initiative is Johannesburg's most ambitious spatial transformation initiative. It operationalized GDS 2040's vision of a spatially just city by promoting transit-oriented development (TOD) along key mobility corridors. These corridors would enhance connectivity between the peri-urban townships and informal settlements and the city's central areas and job opportunities, as well as create a large stock of new socially-mixed and affordable housing. The CoF thus sought to overcome apartheid's spatial legacies by linking marginalized townships with urban cores, promoting mixed-use, mixed-income development, and fostering accessible public spaces. Central to this initiative was the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Rea Vaya system, conceived as both a transport and social integration mechanism.

Managed by the JDA in coordination with various CoJ's departments, the CoF represented a new form of cross-sectoral governance, integrating urban design, housing, infrastructure, and economic development within one strategic spatial framework. The institutional structure of the CoF also reflects a multi-level governance arrangement, with strategic oversight by the City Council and Mayoral Committee (political direction and resource prioritization), technical coordination by the City Transformation and Spatial Planning (CTSP) Directorate, project management and community engagement by the JDA, and partnerships managed by the Provincial Department of Human Settlements, the National Treasury's Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant (NDPG), and international development partners such as the World Bank and UN-Habitat.

The creation of shared public spaces has been a defining feature of the Corridors. These incorporated new parks, pedestrian zones, community facilities, public libraries, sports facilities, and open green spaces, and affordable housing – designed to encourage social interaction across formerly divided communities. These projects

reflect an evolving spatial citizenship, an institutional effort to translate social inclusion into the design and governance of public environments. The CoF's participatory components were channeled through community forums, public exhibitions, and neighbourhood dialogues organized by the JDA. However, evaluations suggest that while these engagements improved transparency, they often struggled to ensure equitable representation, particularly of low-income residents facing displacement pressures from gentrification (Harrison et al., 2019, 2020; Makwela et al., 2024).

<u>Institutional Implications and Challenges</u>

Both the GDS 2040 and Corridors of Freedom reflect Johannesburg's evolution toward strategic, integrative, and participatory governance. They represent attempts to build shared urban spaces not only in physical terms – through parks, transit nodes, and public squares – but also **institutionally,** through cross-sector collaboration and inclusive decision-making.

However, governance fragmentation across departments, inconsistent community participation, and fiscal constraints have limited the realization of GDS 2040's transformative ambitions. Moreover, the political transition following the 2016 local elections led to shifts in priorities, with subsequent administrations rebranding but not fully sustaining the ambitious CoF agenda (Pieterse, 2019). Despite these challenges, both initiatives have institutionalized the principle that spatial transformation and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing.

<u>Conclusion</u>

The transformation of Johannesburg's urban political institutions in the post-apartheid era illustrates the possibilities and limits of institutional reconstruction in post-conflict contexts. The creation of a unified metropolitan authority, the institutionalization of participatory planning, and the proliferation of hybrid development agencies collectively represented significant innovations in democratic governance. Yet, the persistence of socio-spatial inequality (as manifested by the proliferation of gated communities, see map) and the partial capture of participatory mechanisms by technocratic or market forces reveal enduring constraints. Johannesburg's post-apartheid institutions thus embody the dual legacy of post-conflict governance: a commitment to inclusion, justice, and participation, tempered by the pragmatic demands of urban management and economic competitiveness. The city's ongoing projects, such as the CoF, evolve within this institutional tension. By embedding inclusivity into the city's planning apparatus and by physically producing new, shared public spaces, Johannesburg's post-apartheid UPIs serve as a laboratory for transformative urbanism in the Global South.

Corridors of Freedom under construction. © City of Johannesburg Municipality.


PLATE 43 The spread of gated communities in Johannesburg, 2012.
Most gated communities are located in the city's northern suburbs. While some townhouse complexes, one estate and one enclosed neighbourhood have been built in the south, these are scattered and have had little impact on spatial transformation in the area.
Data sources: AfriGIS (2012); GDED (2011b); MDB (2012). Cartography by Willem Badenhorst

Gated communities in Johannesburg, 2012 (Source: Harrison et al., 2014)

## 4. Urban Political Institutions in Inter-communal Mumbai

Mumbai's contemporary urban tensions and politics must be understood in relation to its long and layered history of religious, ethnic, and sociospatial divisions. The **Partition of 1947** between Indian and Pakistan transformed the colonial city of Bombay into a site of both refuge and rupture. The arrival of thousands of Muslim refugees from northern India and the simultaneous outflow of Hindu and Sikh migrants from Pakistan produced patterns of religious clustering, laying the groundwork for communal polarization, segregation, and even ghettoization (See Gupta, 2015; Mhaskar, 2013; Shaban, 2018; Susewind, 2017).

The city continued to grow as India's financial capital but suffered from waves of communal riots especially between Hindus and Muslims, notably in 1969, 1984, and 1992–93, that left thousands dead and revealed the city's deep spatial and institutional vulnerabilities. It was rebranded as Mumbai in 1995 by the ultra-nationalist Hindu government of the State of Maharashtra. Political tensions grew again following the deadly terrorist attacks of 2008. These intercommunal conflicts were not only violent ruptures in the social fabric of Mumbai but also catalysts for institutional reform. Over the last three decades, Mumbai's governance institutions have gradually evolved toward models emphasizing resilience, inclusivity, and participatory governance, even if unevenly realized.

According to the 2011 census, the population of Greater Mumbai was 12.5 million, with a very high population density of approximately 20,500 inhabitants per square kilometre. The larger Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) was home to 20.75 million people, out of which about 9 million, approximately 43%, were slum-dwellers. This hyperdensity combined with informal living conditions may heighten intercommunal competition over urban space and opportunities. In terms of the Greater Mumbai's religious groups, Hindus make up approximately 66% of its population, Muslims 20.65%, Buddhists 4.85%, Jains 4%, Christians 3% and Sikhs 0.5%. The main linguistic-ethnic groups are Maharashtrians (32%) and Gujaratis (20%), with the rest hailing from other parts of India. Marathi is the most widely spoken language, used by 35% of the population, Hindi is spoken by 26% of the population, Urdu and Gujarati by approximately 12% of the population each. Many Hindi speakers are workers from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar who migrate seasonally to the city. This diverse background and the division between an indigenous population and "migrants" from elsewhere in India has intensified local urban politics, notably with the ascent of Shiv Sena, a nativist, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim movement and political party.

The Indian National Congress dominated Mumbai's politics from independence until the early 1980s, when the Shiv Sena won the 1985 municipal elections. The rise

of regionalist politics had begun in the 1960s, driven by resentment over the perceived marginalisation of Marathi people in Mumbai. In 1985, the party shifted from its regional "Marathi cause" to a broader Hindutva platform and allied with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a national right-wing conservative party that has governed India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014. The Shiv Sena underwent a significant split in 2022, dividing into two factions.


Greater Mumbai and MMR (Source: MMRDA, Regional Plan 2016-2036)

The Institutional Landscape of Mumbai

The **Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai** (MCGM), more commonly known as the **Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC)**, governs the core city within a multi-scale governance structure that includes the wider **Mumbai Metropolitan Region** (MMR), the **State of Maharashtra**, and the Union Government of India based in New Delhi. As India's wealthiest and most autonomous municipal body, it has been a focal site of post-conflict reconstruction, social policy, and infrastructural planning.

Originally established under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, the BMC holds the largest budget of any municipal corporation in India. It is headed by a Municipal Commissioner, an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer appointed by the Government of Maharashtra, who serves as the chief executive and oversees the delivery of civic services and infrastructure. Mumbai is divided into 24 administrative wards, ordered alphabetically from Ward A to Ward T, which are further subdivided

into 227 civic electoral wards. Each electoral ward is represented by a directly elected Corporator. Elections are held every five years, and the Corporation also includes five nominated Councillors with knowledge of municipal administration. (In the 2026 municipal corporation elections, the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance secured 118 of the 227 seats, with the BJP alone winning 89.) The Corporators elect a Mayor from among themselves, who serves as the First Citizen of Mumbai for a term of two and a half years. The Mayor's role is both ceremonial, representing the city, and functional, presiding over the deliberations of the Corporation. As of June 2008, all administrative business in the BMC is conducted in Marathi, though it also accepts forms in English following some controversy over the original decision.

Source: LSE Urban Age[13]

Institutional Reforms after the 1992–93 Riots

The 1992–93 communal riots, which claimed over 900 lives, fundamentally changed the city's approach to governance. Specifically, the Srikrishna Commission Report (1998) exposed failures of both police and civic institutions in preventing violence and recommended structural reforms to promote accountability and representation in local governance. More broadly, following the riots, which affected mostly low-income communities in slum areas of the city, two institutional imperatives emerged: social integration and slum regularization, aimed at mitigating spatial segregation and marginalization; and urban security and resilience (further institutionalized through

---

[13] https://urbanage.lsecities.net/data/mumbai-s-governance-structure-2007

multi-level disaster and security management structures after the 2005 floods and 2008 terror attacks). To address these issues, new governance instruments and semi-autonomous agencies were created, focusing on slum rehabilitation, civil society engagement, and resilience and security governance.

<u>Slum Rehabilitation as a Mechanism of Social Inclusion</u>

In 1995, the state established the **Slum Rehabilitation Authority** (SRA), a pivotal urban institution tasked with formalizing and upgrading informal settlements, which housed nearly 55% of the city's population. The SRA introduced the **Slum Rehabilitation Scheme** (SRS), based on cross-subsidization: private developers rebuild slum housing in exchange for additional development rights (on site or elsewhere). This model sought to foster social inclusion through housing regularization. While the SRA was not explicitly designed as a peacebuilding or anti-discrimination framework, it introduced mechanisms that have had important implications for multi-ethnic and religiously mixed neighborhoods:

- Residency-based eligibility: Rehabilitation benefits are based on documented residence, not religion or caste. This was critical in protecting displaced Muslim and Dalit households after the 1992–93 riots, which often left them without property documents but with community verification.

- Community housing cooperatives: Each project forms a registered cooperative housing society, whose members elect representatives to negotiate with developers and SRA officials. These cooperatives have been key to local self-governance, especially in diverse settlements like Dharavi and Mankhurd.

- NGO and civil society mediation: NGOs such as the **National Slum Dwellers Federation** (NSDF) play facilitative roles, helping residents understand their rights, ensure fair resettlement, and maintain community control over projects. These organizations have also advocated for women's leadership and caste-minority representation within housing cooperatives.

However, these inclusive structures often face institutional capture by politically connected developers and local elites. Studies show that market incentives tend to outweigh social goals, leading to uneven outcomes. While some residents gained secure tenure, many low-income or minority residents were displaced to peripheral areas with limited access to work and public services (See Appadurai, 2001; Bhide 2023, 2020, 2017; Burra, 2005; Doshi, 2013, 2019; Patel and Arputham, 2012; Weinstein, 2014).

Similarly, in the early 2000s, the **Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority** (MMRDA) focused on large-scale infrastructure projects as a means to enhance economic development and spatial integration. Through World Bank-supported programs like the **Mumbai Urban Transport Project** and the **Mumbai**

Urban Infrastructure Project, it sought to enhance connectivity across segregated areas and reduce urban vulnerability. But this, too, led to large-scale slum removals and displacement.

Participatory Planning and Civil Society Engagement

The participatory turn in urban governance was already embedded in the **74th Constitutional Amendment Act (1992)**, which gave municipalities constitutional status and empowered local **Ward Committees** and **Area Sabhas**.[14] Such participatory institutions represented the emergence of a limited attempt at deliberative democracy as a response to long-standing practices of exclusion and marginalization of disadvantaged social classes and ethnic groups by the Indian central and local governments. In Mumbai, these units became platforms for dialogue between municipal officials and citizens, though with uneven implementation (Baud & Nainan, 2008; Bhattacharya, 2022). In this context, following the riots, local civil society organizations such as the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF), the Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC), and Mahila Milan gained institutional recognition as partners in urban governance. Through their collaboration with MCGM and the internationally funded **Community-Led Infrastructure Finance Facility**, they helped institutionalize community participation in housing, sanitation, and micro-credit programs. This new informal–formal governance nexus became central to Mumbai's post-conflict institutional fabric, balancing social welfare goals and market logics in contested spaces.

Post-2005 Resilience and Security Governance

Two subsequent shocks, the 2005 floods and the 26/11 terrorist attacks in 2008, which led to renewed religious tensions (Jaishankar, 2007; Khetan et al., 2009), reshaped Mumbai's institutional priorities around urban safety and resilience. Following the 2005 catastrophic flooding that displaced nearly half a million people, the Disaster Management Act (2005) mandated the creation of local disaster management authorities (Gupta, 2007). Mumbai's Disaster Management Cell, under the MCGM, became one of India's most advanced urban emergency response units, integrating GIS-based risk mapping, early warning systems, and citizen hotlines. Institutionally, this represented a shift from reactive crisis management to anticipatory governance, emphasizing interdepartmental coordination between health, housing, water, and transport authorities. The current **Mumbai Disaster Management Plan** continues this legacy, embedding resilience within urban planning processes (Hemani, 2025;

---

[14] A Ward Committee is a democratically elected body headed by the elected representative of a particular ward and includes members who work for the development of the ward. An Area Sabha is defined as the body of electors in the area covered by one or more polling booths in a particular ward. Every ward has a number of Area Sabhas based on the population. https://citizenmatters.in/area-sabha-ward-committee-rules-74th-amendment-urban-local-body/

Parthasarathy, 2016). Such interventions may be relevant also in other urban contexts where accelerating climate risks contribute to political tensions and conflict.

Shared Public Spaces and Heritage Interventions

Public space creation emerged as a key institutional response to the city's fragmented urban fabric. Following both the 1992–93 riots, municipal and state authorities, along with civil society, launched projects designed to rebuild shared civic spaces. This includes the Mumbai Waterfront Reclamation projects, which transformed neglected seafronts into public promenades. These projects institutionalized co-managed public spaces, where residents' associations and local government share maintenance responsibilities (Das, 1996; Movik et al., 2023; Shaha et al., 2017). To a degree, they symbolize post-conflict reconciliation through the creation of open, non-sectarian urban commons – although they mostly serve higher-income populations with leisure time on their hands.

Post-2008, institutions such as the Mumbai Heritage Conservation Society and Mumbai Police Foundation partnered to redevelop the Gateway of India precinct as a secure but accessible memorial space. Similarly, the Kala Ghoda Association expanded public art installations and festivals in an area affected by the attacks to reassert civic openness against narratives of fear. These initiatives demonstrate how heritage institutions became instruments of symbolic and social reconciliation.

Contemporary Plans and Challenges

In recent years, communal tensions in Mumbai seem to have declined in intensity and public policy focus, although they remain relevant to ongoing planning initiatives. The **Mumbai Development Plan 2034 (DP 2034)**, finalized in 2018, integrates participatory inputs and allocates 8% of land for affordable housing and open spaces – but continues to privilege real estate-driven development (Pattaroni et al., 2022). New initiatives such as the **Mumbai Climate Action Plan (2022)** and the **Mumbai Resilience Strategy (2021)**, developed with support from C40 Cities and the World Bank, integrate disaster risk reduction, climate adaptation, and social inclusion under a single urban resilience agenda.

Currently, the **Dharavi Redevelopment Project (DRP)**, relaunched in 2023 by the Government of Maharashtra and awarded to the Adani Group, represents one of the largest urban regeneration projects in the Global South. Covering over 240 hectares and home to nearly one million residents, Dharavi is a not only a dense and highly mixed informal housing area but also an industrial and commercial ecosystem, hosting small-scale manufacturing, recycling, and trade worth over USD 1 billion annually (Echanove & Srivastava, 2016).

The DRP masterplan guarantees one 350-square-foot apartment per eligible family, with *in-situ* relocation wherever possible. It also envisions significant creation of shared public spaces – parks, green corridors, pedestrian networks, and communal squares – intended to foster urban integration and health. The plan also includes provisions for mixed-use zones that allow to retain small-scale industrial activity, a major step toward preserving local livelihoods (Government of Maharashtra, 2023). However, housing rights organizations such as the **Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao Andolan (GBGBA)** warn that the project's private-sector dominance undermines the participatory ethos of earlier community-led upgrading programs and will lead to displacement. Such a large-scale redevelopment project, conceived through a neoliberal paradigm and not addressing the collective identity dimensions of residents, might end up exacerbating intercommunal conflicts.

In its scale, the DRP (Dharavi Redevelopment Plan) may be comparable to a future reconstruction plan for Gaza, although it unfolds in a very different context from Gaza's post-war devastation. Several comparative insights for reconstruction in conflict-affected urban settings emerge:

- Integrated housing and livelihoods: DRP's attempt to preserve local production within redevelopment offers lessons for Gaza, where livelihood-linked rebuilding must integrate economic functionality with housing.

- Participatory governance structures – Mumbai's cooperative societies and NGO mediation show the value of inclusive, bottom-up mechanisms in maintaining community trust. For Gaza, neighborhood reconstruction committees representing local communities could help ensure equity and transparency.

- Risks of privatized redevelopment – The DRP warns against excessive corporatization of reconstruction. Post-conflict contexts like Gaza require public accountability mechanisms, especially when private or international contractors are involved.

Conclusion

Mumbai's experience demonstrates how UPI in post-conflict (or low intensity conflict) contexts evolve through iterative crises. From the legacy of Partition to the communal violence of 1992–93 and the terror of 2008, each moment of rupture has prompted institutional changes. The resulting governance system, spanning formal institutions at various scales (MCGM, SRA, MMRDA, GoM, GoI) and participatory civil-society networks, represents a hybrid model combining top-down administrative capacity with community agency. Through housing regularization, slum upgrading, participatory planning, and the reclaiming of public space, Mumbai's UPIs have attempted to create

shared urban spaces. Yet this remains a strained and unfinished project in a profoundly unequal city with ongoing communal tensions.

5. Urban Political Institutions in the San Diego–Tijuana Transboundary Region

"The Mexican–United States border area is one of the most dynamic regions in North America in terms of population growth, economic development, trade, and the flow of goods and people back and forth across the international boundary. It has experienced rapid urbanization and seen the emergence of population clusters – **pairs of twin border cities,** interdependent and interconnected economically, socially, and environmentally – ranging from Brownville/Matamoros in the East to San Diego/Tijuana in the West. This web of mutual dependencies, epitomized in particular by the border area's water resource constraints and reinforced by the effects of cross-border migration and the area's shared history, have fostered a sense of cross-border community, indeed cultural convergence. However, much as the boundary unites, it continues also to divide: asymmetries in wealth, development, institutional capacity, and governance persist in the border area." (Handl, 2017).

The **San Diego–Tijuana (SDT) transboundary region** (also referred in the literature as a transborder agglomeration or cross-border metropolis), home to 5.5 million people, is one of the world's most tightly interlinked cross-border urban regions. It accounts for 40% of the United States–Mexico border population. Of these, about 1.9m people reside in Tijuana (including a large migrant Mexican population from Sinaloa, Michoacán, Jalisco, Oaxaca, and Mexico City, as well as Latin Americans, notably Cubans and Guatemalans) and 1.4m in San Diego (of which 41% are White, 30% Hispanic-Latino, 17.5% Asian, 6% African American). On the Mexican side, the region has over 700 "maquiladoras", assembly plants which enjoy a special tariff status and serve as the basis of employment for the majority of the working-class people in northern Mexico. At the same time, SDT is shaped by intense conflicts, including the militarization of the U.S.–Mexico border, asymmetries of wealth and power, human rights violations in migration control, and violence linked to drug trafficking and organized crime (Herzog, 2019; Galaviz, 2020). Following the post-9/11 securitization of the border, cross-border movement became a site of confrontation and negotiation. From the mid-2000s onward, a gradual transition to "post-conflict" modalities has occurred through the institutionalization of binational metropolitan cooperation. The region evolved from conflict management to shared governance across domains of planning, infrastructure, environment, and economic development. Thus, the SDT case illustrates how UPIs in "soft-conflict" settings can help build cooperation and resilience across borders amid structural tension and chronic insecurity.

(Source: Rosa et al., 2023[15])

<u>From Security Frontline to Functional Cross-Border Governance</u>

Conflict stabilization institutions in the SDT region arose from bilateral and local responses to migration and security crises. Starting in 1994, the **U.S. Border Patrol's Operation Gatekeeper** hardened the border, yet paradoxically generated new forms of cross-border governance in infrastructure and trade (Ganster & Collins, 2017). At State level, the **Border Governors Conference** (BGC, which operated between 1980-2011) has provided an annual bi-national forum for the review of border issues of mutual concern. In addition, direct State-to-State cross-border cooperation takes place within the ambit of four binational commissions. The **Commission of the Californias** (ComCal, established originally in 1964, dissolved in 2004, and reestablished in 2019) functions as a multilateral forum for regional cooperation between the U.S. state of California and the Mexican states of Baja California and Baja California Sur. It became an institutional interface between state governments, helping depoliticize sensitive issues of security and migration. It serves as a platform for cooperation between the three states in the domains of transportation and

---

[15] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-023-10045-w/figures/1

infrastructure, environment and energy, emergency preparedness and response, economic development and tourism, agriculture, and public health.

At local level **Border Liaison Mechanisms** (BLM) were set up in 1993 and now operate in each of the 15 'sister city' pairs along the border. Within the BLM framework, local communities co-ordinate law enforcement responses to incidents of cross-border crime and violence as well as preventive actions and to share relevant information. BLMs also provide a local framework for day-to-day joint discussion of border environmental issues and response co-ordination. Similarly, local emergency plans now exist for 15 twin border cities, including San Diego/Tijuana.

Most of these cross-border initiatives evince a strong spirit of binationalism. One notable exception is the border fence, a system of mesh fences, solid walls, and vehicular barriers that the US Government completed by the end of 2012 along 652 miles of the international boundary. On the Mexican side, it was perceived as a 'wall of hate'. Tensions grew further following President Trump's repeated calls for a solid wall along the full length of the US–Mexico border, and work on a 15-mile prototype segment of a wall (30 feet high and six feet deep) running from the Pacific coast began in the summer of 2017 (Handl, 2017).

San Diego-Tijuana border infrastructure.[16]

---

[16] Source: https://www.sciencephoto.com/media/876231/view/us-mexico-border-fence-san-diego

From Border-Crossings to Cross-Border Collaborations and Civil Society

Representation institutions emerged to give voice to actors across the border divide.

The **San Diego Dialogue** formed in 1991 as a distinctive collaboration among the University of California, San Diego and the city's business leaders. It established cross-border research, which led to cross-border collaboration, including SENTRI, initially a pilot trusted-traveler rapid lane for frequent border crossers. It has since become a permanent and widely used program facilitating use of the ports of the entry. SDD's key finding – that 96% of border crossings are made by frequent crossers – demonstrated that the region is a bi-national economy and changed the way the US/Mexico border was perceived.

Over time, this led to the **SmartBorder Coalition** (2010), which institutionalized cross-sectoral representation from local governments, chambers of commerce, universities, and NGOs. SBC was established in 2007 as part of the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce and became independent in 2014. It functions as a multi-stakeholder forum that brings together a diverse array of actors from both sides of the border in binational decision-making. While SBC is dedicated to optimizing cross-border mobility, it has a wider collaborative vision: "Our commitment extends to advocating for policies and practices that facilitate smooth and secure border crossings, ensuring that the CaliBaja region remains a thriving hub of international cooperation and commerce."[17]

Civil society networks such as the **US-Mexico Border Philanthropy Partnership (BPP)** have reinforced this dimension. Established in 2008, BPP serves as the leading binational organization focused on building prosperity along the U.S.-Mexico Border region through leadership, collaboration, and philanthropy. Its network is made up of more than 400 members from academia, business and corporate entities, government, philanthropy, and nonprofit organizations spanning all regions of the U.S. and Mexico, sharing a common vision and commitment for a thriving border region and vibrant communities on both sides of the border.[18]

Such collaborations also takes the form of humanitarian infrastructure for migrants. Local institutions such as the Casa del Migrante Tijuana and Border Angels have become informal UPIs, filling governance gaps left by federal migration systems. They provide not only relief but also cross-border advocacy, linking urban governance to human rights norms.

---

[17] https://www.smartbordercoalition.com/about-us
[18] https://www.borderpartnership.org/

Cross-Border Planning and Metropolitan Cooperation Bodies

Integration institutions aim to bridge structural divides in governance, planning, and infrastructure and help stabilize the region by institutionalizing predictable coordination channels, even amid federal-level tensions. Metropolitan planning organizations, universities and consulates operate as key cross-border actors, coordinating data, planning, and advocacy (Ganster 2020). The SDT region thus exemplifies a shift from fragmented coordination to formalized metropolitan-level cooperation. The cities of San Diego and Tijuana share many common economic development interests and develop binational economic projects. Officials from local, state and federal governments, and business communities of both sides of the border meet on a regular basis to discuss plans, including a **Binational Economic Development Forum,** Binational Planning and Coordination Committee**,** Cluster Development Plan**,** Joint Tourism Promotion, and Binational Recycling Market Development Zone.[19]

The **San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG)** is the metropolitan planning organization for San Diego County. It is an association of local county governments, with policy makers consisting of mayors, councilmembers, and county supervisors, and also has capital planning and fare setting powers for the county's transit systems. SANDAG integrates border issues into regional planning through its Borders Committee, coordinating with Tijuana's **Instituto Metropolitano de Planeación (IMPLAN)**. The SANDAG–IMPLAN Cooperation Agreement (2012) was landmark MOU aligning long-term regional plans (*San Diego Forward 2021 Regional Plan* and *Plan Estratégico Metropolitano Tijuana 2034*) around mobility, environment, and land use. This constitutes a de facto binational planning regime. The **Tijuana River Watershed Task Force (TRWTF) and Binational Watershed Advisory Council (BWAC)** bring together the U.S. EPA, Mexico's CONAGUA, and local municipalities to address transboundary water pollution and institutionalize shared environmental governance.[20]

At an even larger scale, the **CaliBaja Bi-National Mega-Region Initiative (2010)** is a strategic partnership linking San Diego County, Imperial Valley, and Baja California under a framework promoting logistics, innovation, and education indicatives across the border.

Despite federal tensions, decentralized cooperation has intensified at the regional and civic levels, reflecting a pragmatic governance culture. However, there are persistent asymmetries in capacity and jurisdiction and lack of a formal metropolitan

---

[19] https://www.sandiego.gov/economic-development/sandiego/trade/mexico/binational

[20] https://trw.sdsu.edu/English/index.html

governance framework spanning both sides of the border (Herzog, 2020; Mendoza & Dupeyron, 2020).

Conclusion: The Border as Post-Conflict Urban Institutional Laboratory

The wide range of UPIs in the SDT transboundary region embody a strategic regionalization and multi-scalar governance experimentation. They produce joint policy frameworks that sustain cross-border collaboration through shared technical rationality rather than political consensus. To a degree, these UPIs also produce a sense of "border citizenship" (Sarabia, 2017), extending rights and advocacy beyond the nation-state (Herzog & Sohn, 2019; Monjaraz & Ramírez Soto, 2023). These representational mechanisms transform former lines of confrontation (e.g. migration, environmental degradation, and policing) into platforms for cooperative deliberation.

The SDT metropolitan region thus stands as a model of "low-conflict" urban institutionalism: a setting where **urban governance replaces geopolitics as the framework for peacebuilding.** Through multiple (multiscale and multisector) institutions, the border has become a laboratory for "peace through planning", transforming security logics into economic development and social inclusion agendas. Yet the current increase in political tensions following the reelection of Trump, migrant rights violations, and cross-border crime continue to test institutional resilience. The durability of these UPIs depends on maintaining multi-level legitimacy, from local civil society to federal cooperation, and expanding representation to those most marginalized by the border itself. Ultimately, the region's evolution underscores a key lesson for other transboundary and post-conflict urban systems: durable peace can be built through functional governance and shared metropolitan space, not merely through political treaties.

6. Conclusion: Comparative Lessons on Urban Political Institutions in Mixed and Transboundary Cities

Across highly diverse geographies and political contexts, whether shaped by ethnic conflict, racial segregation, religious polarization, or geopolitical borders, Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Mumbai, and San Diego–Tijuana demonstrate how UPIs evolve as arenas of negotiation, adaptation, and experimentation in contexts of division. Though each city has its distinct institutional setting, several broad patterns emerge concerning the types of UPIs that have proven most significant. These include institutions of power-sharing and representation, spatial reconstruction, inclusive urban service delivery, and coordination across fragmented jurisdictions.

a. Power-Sharing and Representation: From Peace Agreements to Everyday Governance

The strongest examples of explicitly *power-sharing* urban institutions emerge in **Sarajevo** and **Johannesburg**, where political transitions were negotiated within

comprehensive national settlements (the Dayton Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 1994 democratic transition in South Africa).

The **Canton of Sarajevo** and its layered municipal structure represent an urbanization of the Dayton framework: ethnically balanced, constitutionally guaranteed power-sharing, constrained by inter-entity boundaries. Institutions such as the **Sarajevo Canton Assembly** and **City Council** embody attempts to institutionalize coexistence while mediating fragmented sovereignties.

Johannesburg's experience shows how post-conflict representation can be rearticulated through inclusive municipal restructuring rather than consociational quotas. The creation of the **Unicity metropolitan government** replaced racially divided municipalities with an integrated structure built around participatory and developmental local government. The city's consultative planning processes offer a civic- redistributive model of representation, rather than ethnic quota-based representation.

These two cases together illustrate a continuum: from constitutionally entrenched power-sharing (Sarajevo) to procedurally participatory urban governance (Johannesburg), reflecting different trajectories of political reconciliation.

b. Reconstruction: Urban Space as a Peacebuilding Arena

Post-conflict spatial reconstruction has been pivotal in **Sarajevo** and **Mumbai** alike. Across both cities, reconstruction is both material and symbolic, simultaneously bridging and reproducing divisions, and revealing the ambivalence of post-conflict urban governance.

The donor-driven reconstruction through the **Sarajevo Reconstruction Programme** (supported by the World Bank, UNDP, and EBRD) sought to re-establish multi-ethnic spaces through infrastructure repair and housing return programs. Yet such programs often solidified rather than dissolved ethnic boundaries, given the persistence of parallel administrative jurisdictions.

In Mumbai, institutions like the **Slum Rehabilitation Authority** became vehicles for post-crisis reconstruction following the 1992–93 riots. While formally framed as technocratic planning bodies, they have also functioned as instruments of socio-spatial negotiation, mediating between caste, class, and religious communities. Projects such as the **Dharavi Redevelopment Plan** embody both the promise and the tension of reconstruction: a PPP model of large-scale urban renewal paired with persistent inequities in participation and benefit distribution.

c. Coordination and Integration: Managing Urban Fragmentation

In distinction to the other cases, that play out within conflictual but formally unitary polities, **San Diego–Tijuana** epitomizes trans-boundary urban governance in conditions of fragmented sovereignty. Here, UPIs have not emerged from a formal peace accord or crisis transition but from the everyday pragmatics of living across a hard geopolitical border.

Rather than formal metropolitan institutions, the region has developed a polycentric network of binational entities, specialized in different policy domains: shared environmental resources, infrastructure finance and development, spatial planning, and civic-business networks for economic integration. These institutions operate through functional cooperation rather than political reconciliation, demonstrating a model of multi-level, cross-jurisdictional governance that compensates for the absence of a unified metropolitan authority. San Diego–Tijuana thus extends the UPI concept into transboundary urbanism, where institutional coordination substitutes for sovereignty sharing.

d. A Comparative Typological Framework

Viewed comparatively, these cases highlight four types of Urban Political Institutions that matter most for post-conflict, mixed, and transboundary cities today:

- **Representational Institutions** – aim to translate social and identity diversity into the structures of decision-making. They allow diverse communities to have a sense of self-determination, especially in post-conflict contexts that have legacies of one-sided rule, giving them a seat at the table and a direct say (and veto) over policy-making (Sarajevo, Johannesburg).

- **Reconstruction and Inclusion Authorities** – address displacement and inequity through housing and other services, thus touching on core dimensions of urban conflict and everyday life (Sarajevo, Mumbai).

- **Integrative Planning Mechanisms** – manage shared infrastructure and spatial equity, often through a more strategic, long-term, and multi-scale approach (Johannesburg, Mumbai, SDT).

- **Hybrid or Networked Governance Platforms** – institutionalized or ad-hoc coalitions that coordinate across political borders or entrenched identities even without formal unification (SDT, Sarajevo).

Across these four categories, a broader comparative pattern emerges. Representational institutions address legitimacy and belonging; integrative planning institutions manage spatial coherence; reconstruction and inclusion institutions target socio-economic justice; and hybrid networked institutions handle coordination across scales or borders.

No single type can deliver stability alone: effective urban peacebuilding depends on their interaction.

e. Urban Political Institutions as Interdependent Processes

Therefore, a critical insight is that UPIs are evolving and connected processes rather than discrete organizations. Their "success" lies in their adaptability and ability to span administrative boundaries, negotiate unequal power, and manage contested identities through procedural mechanisms. These political-institutional processes take distinct forms:

- In Sarajevo, fragile intergovernmental institutions sustain coexistence but risk institutionalizing ethnic cleavages.

- In Johannesburg, integrated development frameworks attempt to align economic redistribution with social inclusion.

- In Mumbai, state-led redevelopment institutions navigate an unstable intersection between market logic and community justice.

- In San Diego–Tijuana, a patchwork of technical, environmental, and business institutions coordinates urban life across a militarized border.

In each case, the effectiveness of UPIs depends less on constitutional form than on their capacity to mediate complexity and sustain everyday connection and cooperation. Whether in post-war Sarajevo, post-apartheid Johannesburg, post-riot Mumbai, or the cross-border metropolis of San Diego–Tijuana, UPIs are the front line where peacebuilding, development, and governance intersect. Together they demonstrate that post-conflict and cross-border urban governance converge around a shared challenge: how to govern spatial, social, economic, and environmental interdependence in the absence of political consensus.

References

Beall, J., Goodfellow, T., & Rodgers, D. (2013). *Cities and Conflict in Fragile States in the Developing World*. Urban Studies, 50(15), 3065–3083.

Calame, J., & Charlesworth, E. (2009). *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Fawaz, M. (2009). Neoliberal urbanity and the right to the city: A view from Beirut's periphery. *Development and Change*, *40*(5), 827-852.

Gusic, I. (2019). *Contesting peace in the postwar city: Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar*. Springer Nature.

Isakhan, B. (Ed.). (2015). *Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the 'Islamic State'*. Edinburgh University Press.

Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. United States Institute of Peace Press.

Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. Yale University Press.

Pullan, W. (2011). *Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities*. *The Journal of Architecture*, 16(1), 15–35.

Shirlow, P., & Murtagh, B. (2006). *Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City*. Pluto Press.

Visoka, G. (2017). *Shaping Peace in Kosovo: The Politics of Peacebuilding and Statehood*. Springer.

Sarajevo References

Bădescu, G. (2024). Remaking the urban: International actors and the post-war reconstruction of cities. *International Studies Quarterly*, *68*(2), sqae054.

Badescu, G. (2024). Towards sustainable post-war reconstruction: Reflecting on city-making and conflict. In Klumpner, H., Klearjos, EP, Georgeen, T., (eds.) *Transitioning to Sustainable Cities and Communities*. Basel: MDPI, 2024, pp. 311-331.

Bădescu, G. (2020). Cosmopolitan Heritage?: Post-War Reconstruction and Urban Imaginaries in Sarajevo and Beirut. In *Controversial Heritage and Divided Memories from the Nineteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries* (pp. 121-138). Routledge.

Bădescu, G. (2019) Between repair and humiliation: Religious buildings, memorials, and identity politics in post-war Sarajevo. *Journal of Religion & Society, 19*, 19-37.

Bădescu, G. (2017). Post-war reconstruction in contested cities: Comparing urban outcomes in Sarajevo and Beirut. In *Urban Geopolitics* (pp. 17-31). Routledge.

Bădescu, G. (2015). Dwelling in the post-war city: Urban reconstruction and home-making in Sarajevo. *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, *46*(4), 35-60.

Bădescu, G. (2014). City makers, urban reconstruction and coming to terms with the past in Sarajevo. *Reconstructing Sarajevo Negotiating Socio-Political Complexity*, 14-19.

Bieber, F. (2006). *Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality, and Public Sector Governance.* Palgrave Macmillan.

Bose, S. (2002). *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention.* Oxford University Press.

Clark, J. N. (2009). From negative to positive peace: The case of Bosnia and Hercegovina. *Journal of Human Rights*, *8*(4), 360-384.

Clark, J. N. (2013). Does Bosnia need a truth and reconciliation commission? Some reflections on its possible design. *Ethnopolitics*, *12*(3), 225-246.

Donais, T. (2013). *Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Bosnia.* Routledge.

Martín-Díaz, J. (2021). *The Urban Transformation of Sarajevo*. Springer International Publishing.

Petričević, V., & Schaffer, G. (2024). Engineered Spaces: Bordering Peace in Jerusalem and Sarajevo. *Ethnopolitics*, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2024.2400636

Tzifakis, N., & Tsardanidis, C. (2013). Economic reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The lost decade. In *Internationalized State-Building after Violent Conflict* (pp. 64-81). Routledge.

Tzifakis, N. (2007). The Bosnian peace process: The power-sharing approach revisited. *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs*, (28), 85-102.

UNDP (2009) Assessment of Development Results: Bosnia and Herzegovina

World Bank. (1999). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Local Development Pilot Project*. Washington, D.C.

World Bank. (2000). *Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Review*. Washington, D.C.

Johannesburg References

Beall, J., Crankshaw, O., & Parnell, S. (2002/2014). *Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg*. Routledge.

Beauregard, R., & Tomlinson, R. (2007). The discourse of governance in post-apartheid Johannesburg. *K. Segbergs, The Making of Global City Regions: Johannesburg, Mumbai/Bombay, Sao Paulo, and Shanghai*, 237-257.

City of Johannesburg. (2006). *Growth and Development Strategy*.

City of Johannesburg. (2011). *Joburg 2040: Growth and Development Strategy*.

Harrison, P., Todes, A., & Watson, V. (2007). *Planning and Transformation: Learning from the Post-Apartheid Experience.* Routledge.

Harrison, P. (2016). Strategic planning for transformation in post-apartheid Johannesburg, South Africa. In *Situated Practices of Strategic Planning* (pp. 217-232). Routledge.

Harrison, P., & Rubin, M. (2020). The politics of TOD: The case of Johannesburg's Corridors of Freedom. In *Densifying the City? Global Cases and Johannesburg* (pp. 256-265). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Harrison, P., Rubin, M., Appelbaum, A., & Dittgen, R. (2019). Corridors of Freedom: Analyzing Johannesburg's ambitious inclusionary transit-oriented development. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, *39*(4), 456-468.

Harrison, P., & Todes, A. (2015). Spatial transformations in a "loosening state": South Africa in a comparative perspective. *Geoforum*, *61*, 148-162.

Harrison, P., Gotz, G., Todes, A., & Wray, C. (2014). Materialities, subjectivities and spatial transformation in Johannesburg. In their (eds.) *Changing Space, Changing City: Johannesburg after Apartheid*. Wits University Press.

Lipietz, B. (2008). Building a vision for the post-apartheid city: What role for participation in Johannesburg's city development strategy?. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *32*(1), 135-163.

Makwela, M., Dittgen, R., & Rubin, M. (2024). Planned stitching, practical suturing: Assembling community voices and mobilisation across difference in Johannesburg's Corridors of Freedom. *City*, *28*(5-6), 940-960.

Mbelengwa, S. (2016). *Community Participation in the Integrated Development Plan of the City of Johannesburg Municipality*. Master's thesis, University of Pretoria.

Murray, M. J. (2011). *City of Extremes: The Spatial Politics of Johannesburg*. Duke University Press.

Nengomasha, C. (2021). Post-Apartheid cities in South Africa: a mirage of inclusivity. In *Urban Inclusivity in Southern Africa* (pp. 163-191). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Parnell, S., & Robinson, J. (2006). Development and urban policy: Johannesburg's City Development Strategy. *Urban Studies*, *43*(2), 337-355.

Pieterse, E. (2019). Urban governance and spatial transformation ambitions in Johannesburg. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *41*(1), 20-38.

Robinson, J. (2008). Developing ordinary cities: city visioning processes in Durban and Johannesburg. *Environment and Planning A*, *40*(1), 74-87.

Todes, A. (2012). Urban growth and strategic spatial planning in Johannesburg, South Africa. *Cities*, *29*(3), 158-165.

Tomlinson, R. (1999). Ten years in the making: a history of the evolution of metropolitan government in Johannesburg. *Urban Forum* (Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-39).

Tomlinson, R., Beauregard, R., Bremmer, L., & Mangcu, X. (2003). The Postapartheid Struggle for an Integrated Johannesburg. In their (eds.) *Emerging Johannesburg* (1st ed.). Routledge.

Visser, G. (2001). Social justice, integrated development planning and post-apartheid urban reconstruction. *Urban Studies*, *38*(10), 1673-1699.

Mumbai References

Appadurai, A. (2001). Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics. *Environment and Urbanization*, 13(2), 23–43.

Baud, I.S.A., & Nainan, N. (2008). "Negotiated spaces" for representation in Mumbai: Ward committees, advanced locality management and the politics of middle-class activism. *Environment and Urbanization*, *20*(2), 483-499.

Bhattacharya, R. (2022). Ward Committees as "Invited Space": Is It Successful? A Literature Review of Urban India. *Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore Working Papers*, (546).

Bhide, A. (2023). Structural violence in much more than neoliberal times: The case of slum redevelopment in Mumbai. *City*, *27*(3-4), 483-500.

Bhide, A. (2020a). Everyday violence and bottom-up peace building initiatives by the urban poor in Mumbai. *International Development Planning Review*, *42*(1), 57-71.

Bhide, A. (2020b). Slum Redevelopment in Mumbai as a PPP. In *Critical Reflections on Public Private Partnerships* (pp. 64-78). Routledge.

Bhide, A. (2017). Colonising the Slum: Changing Trajectories of State—Market Violence in Mumbai. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 75-82.

Bhide, A. (2015). *City Produced: Urban Development, Violence, and Spatial Justice in Mumbai*. TISS working paper.

Bhide, A., & Raj, R. (2016). Mumbai in Redevelopment Mode: Implications for Violence and Justice. TISS working paper.

Burra, S. (2005). Towards a Pro-Poor Framework for Slum Upgrading in Mumbai. *Environment and Urbanization, 17*(1), 67–88.

Chowdhury, D.R. (2025) Slumdogs and the Millionaire: What a Project to Transform Mumbai Says About India's Democracy. Toda Peace Institute.

https://toda.org/policy-briefs-and-resources/policy-briefs/report-248-full-text.html

Contractor, Q. (2022). Melancholia of the Past: Remembering Communal Violence in a Mumbai Slum. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, *45*(3), 474-489.

Contractor, Q. (2012) "Unwanted in my city": The making of a "Muslim slum" in Mumbai. In: Gayer & Jaffrelot (eds*) Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalisation.* London: Hurst, pp. 23–42.

Das, P. K. (1996). Restoration of Bombay's waterfronts—political and cultural reflections. *Asian Studies Review*, *19*(3), 45-53.

Doshi, S. (2019). Greening displacements, displacing green: Environmental subjectivity, slum clearance, and the embodied political ecologies of dispossession in Mumbai. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *43*(1), 112-132.

Doshi, S. (2013). The politics of the evicted: redevelopment, subjectivity, and difference in Mumbai's slum frontier. *Antipode*, *45*(4), 844-865.

Echanove, M., & Srivastava, R. (2016). This is not a slum. *World Policy Journal*, *33*(2), 19-24.

Gupta, K. (2007). Urban flood resilience planning and management and lessons for the future: a case study of Mumbai, India. *Urban Water Journal*, *4*(3), 183-194.

Gupta R (2015) There must be some way out of here: Beyond a spatial conception of Muslim

ghettoization in Mumbai? *Ethnography* 16(3): 352–370.

Hemani, C. (2025). Case Study of Developing Mumbai City's Disaster Management Plan Encompassing Global and National Frameworks on Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Resilience. In: Leal Filho, W., et al. *Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Practice.* Springer, Cham.

Jaishankar, K. (2007). India's 26/11: From Communal Violence to Communal Terrorism to Terrorism. *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences*, *2*(2).

Khetan, A., Karkaria, B., Khetan, C., Koshy, G., Joshi, H., Riberio, J., & Shivshankar, R. (2009). *26/11 Mumbai Attacked*. Roli Books Private Limited.

Mhaskar S (2013) *Indian Muslims in a Global City: Socio-Political Effects on Economic Preferences in Contemporary Mumbai.* Gottingen: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.

MMRDA (2019). *Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Plan.* http://mmrda.maharashtra.gov.in/en/planning/regional-plan/final-rp-for-mmr

Movik, S., Adam, H. N., & Alankar, A. (2023). Claiming space: Contested coastal commons in Mumbai. *Geoforum*, *144*, 103805.

Parthasarathy, D. (2016). Decentralization, pluralization, balkanization? Challenges for disaster mitigation and governance in Mumbai. *Habitat International*, *52*, 26-34.

Patel, S., & Arputham, J. (2007). An offer of partnership or a promise of conflict in Dharavi, Mumbai?. *Environment and Urbanization*, *19*(2), 501-508.

Pattaroni, L., Bhide, A., & Lutringer, C. (Eds.). (2022). *Politics of Urban Planning: The Making and Unmaking of the Mumbai Development Plan 2014-2034*. Springer.

Shaban, A. (2018). Ethnic politics, Muslims and space in contemporary Mumbai. In *Lives of Muslims in India* (pp. 208-225). Routledge India.

Shaha, S., & Royb, A. K. (2017). Social Sustainability of Urban Waterfront: The Case of Carter Road Waterfront in Mumbai, India. *Procedia Environmental Sciences*, *37*, 195-204.

Susewind, R. (2017). Muslims in Indian cities: Degrees of segregation and the elusive ghetto. *Environment and Planning A*, *49*(6), 1286-1307.

Weinstein, L. (2014). *The Durable Slum: Dharavi and the Right to Stay Put in Globalizing Mumbai*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

San Diego-Tijuana References

Celaya-Tentori, M., & Barajas-Escamilla, M.R. (2024). The building of cross-border mega-regions: the Cali-Baja experience. *Revista de Estudios Andaluces*,(48), 67-92.

Fulton, B. (2025) What San Diego-Tijuana Can Teach Us About The Future Of Where.

https://futureofwhere.substack.com/p/what-san-diego-tijuana-can-teach

Galaviz, M. G. (2020). *Border Security Infrastructure Projects: Space, Access, and Mobility in the San Diego–Tijuana Transborder Region*. PhD dissertation, University of Texas, Austin.

Ganster, P., & Collins, K. (2017). Binational cooperation and twinning: A view from the US–Mexican border, San Diego, California, and Tijuana, Baja California. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, *32*(4), 497-511.

Ganster, P., & Lorey, D. (2008). *The U.S.–Mexican Border into the Twenty-First Century*. Bloomsbury Academic.

Handl, G. (2017) American–Mexican Boundary Disputes and Cooperation. *Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law* [MPIL].

https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e580

Herzog, L. A. (2020). Cross-Border Planning and Cooperation. In *The U.S.–Mexican Border Environment: A Road Map to a Sustainable 21st Century*. San Diego: SDSU Press.

Herzog, L. A. (1991). Cross-national urban structure in the era of global cities: the US-Mexico transfrontier metropolis. *Urban Studies*, *28*(4), 519-533.

Herzog, L. A., & Sohn, C. (2019). The co-mingling of bordering dynamics in the San Diego–Tijuana cross-border metropolis. *Territory, Politics, Governance, 7*(2), 177-199.

Herzog, L. A., & Sohn, C. (2014). The cross-border metropolis in a global age: A conceptual model and empirical evidence from the US–Mexico and European border regions. *Global Society*, *28*(4), 441-461.

Lara-Valencia, F., & Herzog, L. A. (2021). Border cities: spatial and institutional expressions of bordering. In *Border Cities and Territorial Development* (pp. 76-96). Routledge.

Mendoza, J. E. (2024). Non-Governmental Organizations, Multilevel Governance and Social Services Provision to Migrants in the Tijuana–San Diego Region. *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, *22*(2), 415-428.

Mendoza, J. E., & Dupeyron, B. (2020). Economic integration, emerging fields and cross-border governance: The case of San Diego–Tijuana. *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, *35*(1), 55-74.

Monjaraz Sandoval, A., & Ramírez Soto, A. L. (2023). Transborder cooperation for the development of sustainable cities and communities in the Tijuana-San Diego border region. Review of institutions. *Política, globalidad y ciudadanía*, *9*(18), 23-44.

Pérez-Núñez, S. Mónica, & Serrano-Santoyo, A. (2020). Multi-Actor Network Perspective: CaliBaja an emergent binational innovation ecosystem. *Technology Innovation Management Review*, 10(1): 5-15.

Ramos, J. M. (2003). *Managing Transborder Cooperation on Public Security: The Tijuana–San Diego Region.* Center for U.S. Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.

Rosa, M., Haines, K., Cruz, T. *et al.* A binational social vulnerability index (BSVI) for the San Diego-Tijuana region: mapping trans-boundary exposure to climate change for just and equitable adaptation planning. *Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change,* 28, 12 (2023).

Sarabia, H. (2017). Borderland attachments: citizenship and belonging along the US–Mexico border. In *Building Citizenship from Below* (pp. 66-82). Routledge.

Sosa, O. (2008). Border planning in the San Diego-Tijuana region: local planning and national policy. *Berkeley Planning Journal*, *21*(1).